This paper presents new results on the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity difference between markets are high enough, then price discrimination not only can increase social welfare but also consumer surplus. We also obtain new bounds on the welfare change for logconvex demands. (JEL D42, L12, L13)
Introduction
The criteria developed in the literature for characterizing the effects of third-degree price discrimination on output and welfare have little to say about the case of constant elasticity demand (see, for example, Robinson, 1933 , Schmalensee, 1981 , Varian, 1985 , Schwartz, 1990 , Shih, Mai and Liu, 1988 , Cheung and Wang, 1994 , and, more recently, Cowan, 2007 , Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers, 2010 ACV henceforth, and Cowan, 2012 . ACV state that if both the inverse and direct demands in the weak market (the lower price market) are more convex than in the strong market (the higher price one) then total output rises with discrimination. Unfortunately, with constant elasticity demands this sufficient condition cannot be applied because the direct demand is more convex in the weak market than in the strong market, while the inverse demand is more convex in the strong market. ACV also obtain sufficient conditions for price discrimination to increase welfare that are, again, not satisfied by constant elasticity demands. So, what is it known about the effect of price discrimination on output and welfare under constant elasticity?
ACV prove that output increases with discrimination, 3 and also provide a negative result for welfare: if the elasticity difference is less than one then welfare falls with discrimination. 4 After presenting the model in Section 2 and characterizing the effect of price discrimination on output and prices, we show in Section 3 that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity difference are high enough third-degree price discrimination increases social welfare. Moreover, consumer surplus can also increase but, as expected, only under more stringent conditions as Section 4 shows. We also relate, in Section 5, the effect of price discrimination on consumer surplus to Varian's upper and lower bounds and obtain new upper and lower bounds for the welfare change. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider a monopolist selling a good in two separated markets whose demands exhibit constant elasticity: ( ) = ( ) − , where > 1 is the elasticity and , = 1,2, is a measure of market size. Assume that 2 = 1 + , where > 0 so that market 2 will be the one with the lower discriminatory price and that unit cost is constant > 0. The profit function in market i is ( ) = ( − ) ( ) − , = 1,2. This profit function is not concave, 5 but is single-peaked, reaching its unique maximum at * = /( − 1), = 1,2, the optimal discriminatory price, with * = ( * ) − the output in market i and * = ∑ ( * ) − the total output. The profit function under uniform pricing ( ) = ( − ) ∑ ( ) − is not necessarily quasi-concave and thus may have more than one local maximum. 6 The second derivative of the profit function is ′′ ( ) =
. But from Theorem 1 by Nahata et al. (1990) we state that the optimal uniform price, 0 is such that 1 * > 0 > 2 * and satisfies the FOC ′ ( 0 ) = 0. 7 The Lerner index is ( 0 − )/ 0 = 1/ ( 0 ), where ( 0 ) is the elasticity of the aggregate demand at 0 . From the FOC this elasticity is the weighted average elasticity ( 0 ) = ∑ ( 0 ) , where the elasticity of market i is weighted by the "share" of that market ( 0 ) = ( 0 )/ ∑ ( 0 ). Following Formby et al. (1983) and Aguirre (2006) , we normalize, for the sake of simplicity, the optimal uniform price to be 3 There is some previous research on this aspect. Greenhut and Ohta (1976) show numerically that price discrimination may increase output, and Ippolito (1980) finds that total output increases in all his numerical simulations. Formby, Layson and Smith (1983) use Lagrangean techniques to show that discrimination increases total output over a wide range of constant elasticities. Finally, Aguirre (2006) provides an analytical proof using an inequality due to Bernoulli and ACV simplify and slightly generalize the proof (which uses the fact that demand is convex in the reciprocal of the price). 4 Ippolito (1980) shows using numerical simulations that price discrimination can increase social welfare and consumer surplus. 5 Nahata et al. (1990) show that the profit function is concave for prices below ̅ = ( + 1) /( − 1) and convex for higher prices. 6 The aggregate profit function would be concave (and therefore quasi-concave) in the relevant range of prices if ′′ ( ) < 0 ∀ ∈ [ 2 * , 1 * ]. Note that ′′ ( ) < 0 ∀ ∈ [ 2 * , ̅ 2 ] given the shape of the profit function in market 2. Therefore, a sufficient condition for concavity of the profit function is 1 * ≤ ̅ 2 or, alternatively, 2 ≤ 2 1 − 1. 7 All markets are automatically served under uniform pricing. one, 0 = 1. This allows us to obtain explicitly the quantity sold in each market, 0 = , = 1,2, and the total output 0 = 1 + 2 . Define = 1 /( 1 + 2 ) and
1 − as the shares of market 1 and market 2 under uniform pricing, respectively. Given ( 0 ) and 0 = 1, the marginal cost is
. Price discrimination decreases output in market 1 and increases output in market 2, ∆ 1 < 0 and ∆ 2 > 0, and the change in the total output is ∆
The next assumption allows us to bypass the problem that the profit function is not necessarily quasi-concave. Assumption 1. The elasticity difference belongs to an interval ∈ [0, � ( 1 )] such that 0 = 1 is the global maximizer under uniform pricing.
Assumption 1 ensures that even if there are several local maxima, 0 = 1 is the global maximizer. The critical value depends also on , and, for simplicity we define � ( 1 ) as the higher elasticity difference such that 0 = 1 is the global maximizer regardless of the value of . .8 As Table 1 (see Appendix) illustrates the range of elasticity difference such that 0 = 1 is the global maximizer is much wider than the range of values of such that < 1 − 1, which is the sufficient condition for concavity. Note also that � ′ ( 1 ) > 0.
Effects of price discrimination on welfare
A move from uniform pricing to price discrimination generates a welfare change of ∆ = ∆ 1 + ∆ 2 − ∆ , where ∆ = ( * ) − ( 0 ), = 1,2. 9 As output decreases in the strong market and increases in the weak market, welfare decreases in the strong market and increases in the weak market. The change in welfare in terms of 1 , and is:
(1)
The following lemmas characterize the relationship between the change in welfare and the share of the strong market under uniform pricing.
Lemma 1. The change in social welfare, ∆ , is a convex-concave function of ; that is, there exists � ∈ (0,1) such that ∆ is convex for < � and concave for > �. 10
Proof. We check numerically that 2 ∆ 2 > 0 for < � and 2 ∆ 2 < 0 for > � for all the parameters compatible with Assumption 1 (see Appendix).∎ Lemma 2. Single Crossing Property. Given 1 and the change in social welfare, ∆ , crosses at most once the ∆ = 0-axis for ∈ (0,1).
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 1, given that ∆ ( 1 , , ) = 0 at ∈ {0,1}.∎
We now consider the effect on the change in social welfare of a small change in . The derivative of the change in social welfare with respect to , evaluated at = 1, is:
(2) α evaluate the feasibility of a welfare improvement. Denote by ( 1 ) the elasticity difference such that ∆ � 1 , =1, � = 0. 11 From numerical computations we obtain that the cross derivative 2 ∆ ( 1 , =1, ) is zero at = � ( 1 ) and
Therefore, we have that:
.
(3)
Since ∆ ( 1 , = 1, ) = 0 and, given that ∆ ( 1 , =1, ) < 0 when > ( 1 ), there exists a cutoff value ≡ ( 1 , ) such that if > price discrimination increases welfare. The next proposition summarizes the results.
where ( 1 ) > 1, then there exists a cutoff value ≡ ( 1 , ) such that: 12 (i) when < price discrimination reduces welfare, (ii) when = welfare remains unchanged, (iii) when > price discrimination increases welfare.
Note that the ACV negative result is a special case of the analysis here:
∆ ( 1 , =1, ) > 0 when ≤ 1 which implies (given the single crossing property) that price discrimination reduces welfare when the elasticity difference is not high enough. Table  2 in Aguirre and Cowan (2013) provides the critical value of the share of market 1
( 1 , ) above which price discrimination increases welfare. The critical value is a Ushaped function of the elasticity difference: first the critical value decreases with but then (for a high enough elasticity in market 1) increases with . It is also possible to show that the critical value is a U-shaped function of the elasticity ratio and the passthrough ratio (that is, the ratio of the slope of inverse demand to the slope of marginal revenue). 13 To provide some more intuition, note that from ACV (Proposition 6) a necessary condition for welfare to be higher with discrimination is that > 1. Now allow 0 to change. Since =
, the share of the strong market is 11 Numerical computations allow us to conclude that ′ ( 1 ) > 0.
12 Of course, � ( 1 ) > ( 1 ). For instance, � (2) = 7 > 1.3102 = (2) or � (3) = 11.9 > 1.3616 =
(3). 13 See Weyl and Fabinger (2013) for an extensive analysis of pass-through. larger the higher is the uniform price, 0 . In turn the uniform price is increasing in and in the relative size parameter 1 2 ⁄ .
Effects on consumer surplus
Consumer surplus in market i is ( ) = ( ) − ( ) , so the change in consumer surplus is given by:
Consider again the effect of a small change in α on consumer surplus at = 1:
Denote by ( 1 ) the elasticity difference such that (∆ ( 1 , =1, )) = 0. Hence we have:
Since ∆ ( 1 , = 1, ) = 0 and given that (∆ ( 1 , =1, )) < 0 when > ( 1 ), there exists a cutoff value ≡ ( 1 , ) such that if > consumer surplus increases with price discrimination. Again the change in consumer surplus satisfies a single-crossing property and so we can state that when < price discrimination reduces consumer surplus. Since price discrimination increases profits, necessarily ( 1 ) > ( 1 ): to increase consumer surplus the elasticity difference must be greater than the difference needed to increase welfare. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. If ∈ [ ( 1 ), � ( 1 )], then there exists a cutoff value ≡ ( 1 , ) > such that: 14 (i) when < price discrimination reduces consumer surplus, (ii) when = consumer surplus remains unchanged, (iii) when > price discrimination increases consumer surplus. Table 4 in Aguirre and Cowan (2013) illustrates the critical value for the share of market 1 under uniform pricing above which the consumer surplus increases with price discrimination. As expected, for consumer surplus to increase, we need a cutoff value for the share of market 1 higher than the one needed for welfare to increase (see also their Table 2 ).
New bounds on the change in welfare under log-convex demand
We next relate the change in consumer surplus due to a move from uniform pricing to price discrimination to Varian's (1985) upper bound (VUB) and lower bound (VLB) which under constant elasticity are:
We will use the property that strictly log-convex demand functions exhibit what Mrázová and Neary (2013) call "Super-Pass-Through": the optimal price rises by more than the increase in marginal cost. The next lemma states the property.
Lemma 3. The cost pass-through coefficient exceeds 1, ′ ( ) ′′ ( ) > 1, when demand functions are strictly log-convex. 15 14 Of course, � ( 1 ) > ( 1 ). For instance, � (2) = 7 > 2.4091 = (2) or � (3) = 11.9 > 5.1699 = (3). 15 Lemma 3 might be equivalently enunciated in terms of inverse demand. That is, the cost pass-through coefficient exceeds 1 when ( ) − is strictly log-convex. Amir (1996) uses the same property but to guarantee in a context of Cournot oligopoly that the game is log supermodular.
Proof. Amir, Maret and Troege (2004) was the first to get this result (see also Weyl and Fabinger, 2013, and Mrázová and Neary, 2013) . Note that ′ ( )
if and only if ′ ( ) + ′′ ( ) > 0 (given strictly concavity of the profit function,
The direct demand is defined as ≡ ( ( )). Differentiating once gives 1 = ′ ( ( )) ′ ( ), and twice yields (omitting arguments) 0 = ′′ [ ′ ] 2 + ′ ′′ . When direct demand is strictly log-convex (that is log is strictly convex) then ′′ − [ ′ ] 2 > 0. But, by using second derivative of the demand identity we get: ′′ − 
with strict inequalities if ∆ ≠ 0, = 1,2. 17
Proof. Let consumer surplus as a function of quantity be ( ) = ( ) − ( ) . 18 It follows that
, the cost pass-through coefficient, with strict log-convexity exceeds 1 (see Lemma 16 The strictly log-convex demand family is much wider than constant elasticity demand family. Mrázová and Neary (2013) classify strictly log-convex demands or demands with super pass-through taking as a base the family of constant elasticity demands (CES demands). They consider three types of strictly logconvex demands: strictly super convex demands, constant elasticity demands and strictly sub convex demands. Super convexity of a demand function at an arbitrary point is equivalent to the function being more convex at that point than a CES demand function with the same elasticity. 17 The lower bound for consumer surplus is the same as Varian's lower bound for welfare. 18 Bulow and Klemperer (2012) illustrate how consumer surplus equals the area between the inverse demand curve and the marginal revenue curve up to a given quantity.
3) so ′′ ( ) < 0 (provided that ′′ ( ) < 0). By concavity of consumer surplus, the change in aggregate consumer surplus is bounded above:
(12) Figure 2 represents the social welfare change, Varian's upper and lower bounds, and the NUB and NLB when 1 = 2 and = 4. Varian's upper bound is always positive because price discrimination increases output under constant elasticity, so his necessary condition for welfare improvement always is satisfied. However, our necessary condition only would be satisfied if were (more or less) higher than 60%. Similarly, Varian's lower bound is negative for any but our NLB indicates that if were higher than about 86% then the sufficient condition for welfare improvement would be satisfied. 
Concluding remarks
The possibility that third-degree price discrimination generates a welfare improvement increases with the elasticity difference and the share of the strong market under uniform pricing. The critical value of the share of the strong market above which price discrimination increases welfare is a U-shaped function of the elasticity difference, the elasticity ratio and the pass-though ratio. Price discrimination may also increase consumer surplus but, of course, under more stringent conditions. We also generalize a property satisfied by constant elasticity demands to obtain new upper and lower bounds on social welfare when demand functions are strictly log-convex. − Ψ 2 2(2 1 + 2 − 1)( 1 + − 1) ( 1 + ) 2 � ( 1 + − 1) ( 1 + ) � 1 + −2 + Ψ 4 (1 − )(2 1 + 2 − 1)( 1 + − 2)( 1 + − 1) 2
. It can be checked by numerical computations that 2 ∆ 2 crosses at most once the horizontal axis (we have checked numerically for 1 ∈ {1.5,2,3,4, … ,10} and for any elasticity difference compatible with Assumption 1): this guarantees that the change in welfare is a concave-convex function of .
Cross Derivative
where Γ = � 1 ( 1 + −1)
( 1 −1)( 1 + ) � 1 + −1 . We have checked numerically that:
